2024 Moldovan presidential election
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Turnout | 51.74% (first round) | |||||||||||||||
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Results by first-level administrative divisions, sectors of Chișinău and abroad Sandu: 30–35% 35–40% 40–45% 45–50% 50–55% 55–60% 70–75% Stoianoglo: 25–30% 30–35% 35–40% 40–45% 45–50% Usatîi: 30–40% | ||||||||||||||||
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Administrative divisions |
Moldova portal |
Presidential elections were held in Moldova on 20 October 2024,[1][2] with a runoff to be held on 3 November.[3] Incumbent president Maia Sandu and former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo advanced to the runoff, with Sandu winning the first round with about 42% and Stoianoglo winning about 26%.[4]
The Guardian described the election as a choice between the West and Russia, with Sandu representing the pro-European Union side and Stoianoglo the pro-Russian side.[5] According to Moldovan newspaper ZDG, Victoria Furtună, who came in fifth, was a pro-Russian candidate.[6]
In addition on the same day a narrow majority of Moldovans voted "yes" to add EU membership to the country's constitution. This was seen as a victory for Sandu who campaigned for the "yes" side, although the result was closer than expected, a fact Sandu blamed on alleged Russian-sponsored interference on the election, including vote buying organised by Russian-trained groups.[7] International observers also noted misuse of administrative resources and unbalanced media coverage in favor of the incumbent.
Electoral system
Date
On 17 April 2024, Parliament speaker Igor Grosu announced the holding of the presidential election in conjunction with the referendum on joining the European Union (EU) on 20 October.[1] The decision was approved by the Parliament of Moldova on 16 May.[8][9]
Eligibility requirements
The Constitution of Moldova (Article 78, Clause 2) defines four conditions that a presidential candidate must satisfy: Moldovan citizenship, at least 40 years of age, residence in Moldova for at least 10 years, and ability to speak the state language. Article 80 of the Constitution establishes a term limit: one individual cannot serve more than 2 terms in a row.[10]
Procedure
Candidates can be nominated by a political party, an electoral alliance, or run as independents. They have to collect at least 15,000 voter signatures in their support from at least half of Moldova's level 2 administrative territorial units with at least 600 signatures in each of them.[11] The election results can be considered valid only if the turnout is above or equal to 33.33%.[12] The candidate who receives an absolute majority of the votes is elected president. If no candidate receives a majority of the votes, a second round between the top 2 candidates is held two weeks after the first round. The candidate with the largest number of votes in the second round then becomes president.[13]
Security concerns
Moldovan authorities have accused Russian-trained groups of plotting to destabilise the election.[14]
In June 2024, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada issued a joint statement on Russian influence within the Moldovan election.[15][16][17][18] At the same time, the US also announced sanctions against the Governor of Gagauzia Evghenia Guțul, who it alleged is an "active facilitator" of Russian-backed election influence.[19]
In September 2024, incidents of vandalism on the offices of the Supreme Court of Justice of Moldova and on the public broadcaster Teleradio-Moldova were attributed to the said groups.[20] In October 2024, authorities announced the discovery of a plot by exiled pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor involving $15 million in funds from Russia that were distributed to around 130,000 people in order to bribe voters into selecting anti-Western decisions, and spread disinformation against the European Union on social media, following raids on 26 locations nationwide.[21][22] Russia denied the accusations.[23] Security checks were strengthened at Chișinău International Airport following an influx of passengers from Russia carrying large amounts of cash believed to be connected with the plot.[24]
Later that month, Moldova accused Russia of plotting to bus in voters to polling stations at the Moldovan Embassy in Moscow. In response, the EU imposed sanctions on five officials from the autonomous Gagauzia region and on one Russian-based entity involved in the influence operation.[25] The United States accused Russia of spending “millions of dollars” to support its preferred parties and spreading disinformation online.[26][27] The Russian foreign ministry in turn accused Moldova of printing only 10,000 ballots for 500,000 eligible Moldovans living in Russia.[28]
On 17 October, Moldovan authorities announced the discovery of another plot in which 100 youths were trained in Moscow, Serbia and Bosnia by private military groups to foment civil unrest, including using nonlethal weapons to create “mass disorder” during the election and referendum, adding that four people had been arrested and that some of them received several thousand euros in payments.[29]
Olga Roșca, a foreign policy adviser to Sandu, warned that "Russia is pouring millions in dirty money to hijack our democratic processes. This isn't just meddling, it's full-blown interference aimed at destabilising our future. And it is alarming."[5]
The European Union deployed its Cyber Rapid Response Team led by Lithuania to Moldova in order to oversee cybersecurity concerns in the election and referendum following a request from the Moldovan Information Technology and Cyber Security Service.[30]
Campaign
Sandu and Stoianoglo participated in an electoral debate on 27 October without moderators, during which Stoianoglo said that he would continue to support Ukraine while Sandu accused him of being "Moscow's man".[31][32]
Election
Approximately 2.8 million ballots were issued for the election and the EU membership referendum. For the first time in Moldova, ballots were featured not only in Romanian but also in as many as five minority languages. Thus, 2,092,641 ballots were in Romanian, 631,979 in Russian, 3,400 in Gagauz, 991 in Bulgarian, 870 in the Romani language and 115 in Ukrainian. For voters in the pro-Russian separatist region of Transnistria, 90,000 ballots were issued, of which 45,000 were in Romanian and the rest in Russian.[33]
For the election and the referendum, 234 polling stations were opened abroad. The first vote in both was cast by Ludmila Vizdoagă, a woman who at the time had lived in South Korea for 19 years. She traveled from Seoul to Tokyo to vote in the polling station for Japan, which was the first to be opened.[33] A polling station was also set up in Varnița to serve voters from Transnistria.[34]
Voting was held from 07:00 to 21:00.[34] As of 15:00, the minimum turnout of 33.33% necessary for the validation of the election had been reached with a turnout of 35.57%.[35]
Candidates
Between 21 and 31 August, the Central Electoral Commission of Moldova (CEC) received 23 applications for the registration of initiative groups in support of 19 candidates, of which 13 applications were accepted.[36] Two of these initiative groups failed to get their candidate registered into the election.
Name | Born | Campaign | Experience | Party | Status | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Maia Sandu |
24 May 1972 (52) Risipeni, Fălești District |
(website) |
President of Moldova (2020–present) Prime Minister of Moldova (2019) Minister of Education (2012–2015) |
Independent[a] | Registered[37] | |
Alexandr Stoianoglo |
3 June 1967 (57) | Prosecutor General of Moldova (2019–2021)
Vice President of the Parliament (2009–2010) |
Independent | Registered[38] | ||
Renato Usatîi |
4 November 1978 (45) Fălești |
(website) |
Mayor of Bălți (2015–2018, 2019–2021) | Our Party | Registered[39] | |
Vasile Tarlev |
9 October 1963 (61) | (website) |
Prime Minister of Moldova (2001–2008) | Future of Moldova Party endorsed by the Party of Communists |
Registered[40] | |
Irina Vlah |
26 February 1974 (50)
Comrat |
(website) |
Governor of Gagauzia (2015–2023) | Independent | Registered[41] | |
Ion Chicu |
28 February 1972 (52) | Prime Minister of Moldova (2019–2020)
Minister of Finance (2018–2019) |
Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova | Registered[41] | ||
Andrei Năstase |
6 August 1975 (49) | (website) |
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Internal Affairs (2019) | Independent | Registered[42] | |
21 August 1972 (52) | Member of the Moldovan Parliament (2019–2021)
Minister of Youth and Sport (2013) |
Together Bloc | Registered[42] | |||
Victoria Furtună | 24 February 1981 (43) | (website) |
Anti-corruption prosecutor | Independent | Registered[43] | |
Tudor Ulianovschi |
25 May 1983 (41) | (website) |
Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (2018–2019)
Ambassador to Switzerland and Liechtenstein; Permanent Representative to the United Nations (2016–2018) |
Independent | Registered[43] | |
Natalia Morari |
12 January 1984 (40)
Hîncești |
(website) |
Journalist
Host of Morari.live |
Independent | Registered[43] |
Rejected candidates
The following people had their registration as candidates for the election rejected by the Central Electoral Commission:
- Igor Munteanu (Coalition for Unity and Welfare[b]), Ambassador to the United States, Canada and Mexico (2010–2015);[45] he had previously gotten his initiative group registered,[46] but the CEC invalidated some of the signatures in his support submitted by his party and he fell short of the minimum number required for his registration as a candidate.[45]
- Vasile Bolea (independent), Member of the Moldovan Parliament (2014–present); the CEC rejected his registration as a candidate, arguing that he was backed by the bloc Victory and the party Revival despite having claimed to have disassociated himself from Revival to participate as an independent candidate. Revival is part of the bloc Victory, led by fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor. The CEC did not allow Victory to participate in the election.[47]
- Valeriu Pleșca (European Social Democratic Party), Minister of Defense (2004–2007)[48]
- Valentin Borodachi (independent)[49]
- Ludmila Corsun (independent)[50]
- Avelin Tabarcea (independent)[51][52]
Furthermore, Alexandru Arseni, whose initiative group supporting his candidacy had been successfully registered, did not submit the necessary documents for his inscription on the ballot of the election,[53] having previously failed to obtain the required number of signatures in his support within the required time frame.[54]
Declined
The following people were subjects of speculation about their potential candidacy within the previous months, but they rejected the speculation and announced they would not run as a candidate:
- Ion Ceban, Mayor of Chișinău (2019–present)[55]
- Igor Dodon, President of Moldova (2016–2020)[56][57]
- Vlad Filat, Prime Minister of Moldova (2009–2013)[58]
- Teodor Cârnaț, Member of the Superior Council of Magistrates (2013–2017)
Opinion polls
Registered candidates
Fieldwork date |
Polling firm/ Commissioner |
Sample size | Undecided/ Abstention/ None/ Other | |||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Maia Sandu | Alexandr Stoianoglo | Renato Usatîi | Vasile Tarlev | Irina Vlah | Ion Chicu | Andrei Năstase | Octavian Țîcu | Victoria Furtună | Tudor Ulianovschi | Natalia Morari | ||||
Independent | Independent | PN | PVM | Independent | PDCM | Independent | BÎ | Independent | Independent | Independent | ||||
11–16 Oct 2024 | WatchDog[59] | 1,034 | 35.8% | 9.0% | 6.4% | 1.3% | 2.2% | 1.2% | 0.8% | 0.4% | 1.4% | 0.1% | 0.5% | 40.9% |
19 Sep–10 Oct 2024 | iData–IPP[60][61] | 1,100 | 29.5% | 11.6% | 13.3% | 6.1% | 4.5% | 3.4% | 1.1% | 1.3% | 5.5% | 4.3% | 0.4% | 18.9% |
13–22 Sep 2024 | ASPEN–APEC–WatchDog[62] | 1,021 | 36.1% | 10.1% | 7.5% | 1.8% | 4.1% | 2.5% | 0.6% | 0.8% | 0.5% | 0.8% | 0.6% | 34.6% |
13–18 Sep 2024 | iData[63] | 1,021 | 26.8% | 11.2% | 12.7% | 6.3% | 6.1% | 4.1% | 0.9% | 0.7% | 0.1% | 3.5% | 1.8% | 25.8% |
30 Aug–2 Sep 2024 | Intellect Group[64] | 596 | 24.5% | 12.0% | 6.2% | 4.7% | 5.0% | 1.5% | 3.5% | – | – | – | 2.0% | 40.6% |
19–25 Aug 2024 | iData[65] | 1,004 | 27.5% | 11.4% | 11.6% | 5.8% | 3.3% | 2.8% | 1.2% | – | – | – | – | 36.4% |
20–23 Aug 2024 | CBS Research–WatchDog[66] | 1,011 | 35.5% | 9.9% | 6.8% | 1.8% | 5.8% | 3.0% | 1.2% | 1.3% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 34.0% |
8–21 Jul 2024 | IMAS[67] | 1,093 | 33.7% | 11.5% | 10.8% | 1.2% | 8.9% | 6.0% | 1.4% | 0.9% | – | 0.1% | 1.1% | 24.4% |
Second round
Sandu vs. Stoianoglo
Fieldwork date |
Polling firm/ Commissioner |
Sample size | None/ Undecided/ Abstention | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Maia Sandu | Alexandr Stoianoglo | ||||
Independent | Independent | ||||
19 Sep–10 Oct 2024 | iData | 1,100 | 40.6% | 36.4% | 23% |
Hypothetical candidates
Fieldwork date |
Polling firm/ Commissioner |
Sample size | Other | None/ Undecided/ Abstention | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Maia Sandu | Igor Dodon | Alexandr Stoianoglo | Ion Ceban | Ilan Shor | Vladimir Voronin | Ion Chicu | Marina Tauber | Renato Usatîi | Irina Vlah | |||||
Independent | PSRM | Independent | MAN | ȘOR | PCRM | PDCM | ȘOR | PN | Independent | |||||
28 Jun–18 Jul 2024 | CBS-AXA-IPRE | 1,119 | 30.3% | 13.0% | 1.0% | 5.4% | 2.5% | 3.4% | 3.2% | – | 6.5% | 5.6% | 6.3% | 23% |
23 May–13 Jun 2024 | IRI[68] | 1,225 | 34% | 18% | – | 4% | 4% | – | 5% | – | 5% | 4% | 3% | 24% |
22–27 May 2024 | iData[69] | 1,022 | 30.4% | 14.3% | – | 3.0% | – | 2.5% | 6.1% | – | 3.9% | 1.6% | 6.1% | 32.1% |
2–19 May 2024 | IMAS[69] | 1,088 | 35.2% | 16.4% | – | 5.9% | – | 5.3% | 5.7% | – | 4.7% | 4.1% | 7.8% | 14.9% |
6–13 Apr 2024 | CBS-AXA–WatchDog[70] | 1,008 | 35.1% | 15.8% | – | 5.4% | 1.7% | 4.6% | 5.6% | – | 3.9% | 4.5% | 5.3% | 18.0% |
18–24 Mar 2024 | iData[71] | 1,131 | 27.9% | 13.3% | – | 4.4% | – | 2.6% | 5.7% | – | 3.0% | 4.3% | 6.5% | 32.3% |
27 Jan–22 Feb 2024 | IRI[72] | 1,247 | 30% | 24% | – | 6% | 4% | – | 5% | – | 4% | 4% | 1% | 22% |
7–12 Feb 2024 | CBS Research[73] | 1,104 | 29.8% | 14.8% | – | 4.5% | 8.5% | 1.6% | 5.0% | – | 4.4% | 4.8% | 4.1% | 22.4% |
26–30 Jan 2024 | iData[74] | 1,011 | 24.1% | 29.7% | 46.2% | |||||||||
29 Nov–16 Dec 2023 | IMAS[75] | 954 | 30.1% | 24.0% | – | 8.1% | – | 2.7% | 6.1% | – | 4.1% | 5.6% | 6.0% | 13.3% |
2–24 Sep 2023 | IMAS[76] | 822 | 27.8% | 16.0% | – | 6.0% | – | 4.3% | 5.9% | – | 6.0% | 4.9% | 4.7% | 24.4% |
9–23 Aug 2023 | CBS-AXA–IPP[77] | 1,215 | 29.4% | 18.1% | – | 5.6% | 3.2% | 1.5% | 4.1% | – | 5.1% | – | 3.0% | 30.1% |
13–28 Jun 2023 | CBS-AXA–IPRE[78] | 1,120 | 32.6% | 17.8% | – | 5.3% | 3.3% | 4.3% | 2.9% | 3.0% | 4.3% | – | 1.5% | 24.0% |
10–19 Jun 2023 | CBS-AXA–WatchDog[79] | 1,121 | 37.9% | 14.2% | – | 6.2% | 2.5% | 4.7% | 5.0% | 3.5% | 4.7% | – | 3.0% | 18.3% |
2–19 May 2023 | IMAS[80] | 1,112 | 28.5% | 23.9% | – | 8.3% | – | 3.7% | 7.2% | 2.7% | 3.8% | – | 4.1% | 18.0% |
27 Apr–8 May 2023 | iData[81] | 1,049 | 30.4% | 18.3% | – | 6.7% | 12.2% | – | 5.9% | – | 4.5% | 2.8% | 1.5% | 17.7% |
4–13 Apr 2023 | CBS-AXA–WatchDog[82] | 1,015 | 38.3% | 18.4% | – | 6.2% | 2.5% | 3.2% | 4.9% | 2.2% | 3.2% | – | 1.9% | 19.2% |
15–26 Mar 2023 | iData[83] | 1,065 | 29.4% | 17.6% | – | 7.2% | 9.2% | 0.9% | 5.4% | – | 1.7% | 3.1% | 1.7% | 23.9% |
24 Feb–3 Mar 2023 | CBS-AXA–WatchDog[84] | 1,000 | 31.8% | 17.8% | – | 4.7% | 2.0% | 3.5% | 3.3% | 1.8% | 2.0% | 2.1% | 2.1% | 28.8% |
6–23 Feb 2023 | IMAS[85] | 1,100 | 25.2% | 20.4% | – | 8.2% | – | 4.9% | 5.4% | 4.3% | 3.4% | – | 3.8% | 24.6% |
17–26 Jan 2023 | CBS-AXA–WatchDog[86] | 1,001 | 28.2% | 17.6% | – | 8.5% | 4.2% | 3.9% | 3.9% | 2.4% | 3.5% | 1.8% | 4.0% | 21.8% |
15–26 Dec 2022 | iData[87] | 1,006 | 27.2% | 24.1% | – | 10.0% | 13.4% | 0.6% | 5.0% | 0.2% | 0.5% | 0.1% | 3.0% | 16.0% |
10–29 Nov 2022 | IMAS[88] | 1,100 | 26.9% | 19.6% | – | 8.8% | – | 4.0% | 7.1% | 2.8% | 2.2% | – | 7.3% | 21.3% |
29 Oct–10 Nov 2022 | CBS Research/IPP[89] | 1,134 | 27.3% | 15.4% | – | 7.1% | 9.1% | 4.3% | – | – | 2.9% | – | 3.5% | 30.5% |
29 Sep–11 Oct 2022 | IDIS–CBS Research–IPRI[90] | 1,066 | 34.1% | 19.1% | – | 7.1% | 6.3% | 5.2% | 2.5% | – | 3.3% | 1.2% | 3.2% | 18.1% |
6–18 Jul 2022 | IMAS[91] | 1,007 | 24.4% | 25.4% | – | 9.2% | – | 7.1% | 5.2% | 3.6% | 2.8% | – | c. 5.4% | 16.0% |
Hypothetical second rounds
Sandu vs. Ceban
Fieldwork date |
Polling firm/ Commissioner |
Sample size | None/ Undecided/ Abstention | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Maia Sandu | Ion Ceban | ||||
Independent | MAN | ||||
6–13 Apr 2024 | CBS-AXA–WatchDog | 1,008 | 40.2% | 32.3% | 27.4% |
7–12 Feb 2024 | CBS Research[73] | 1,104 | 39.5% | 35% | 25.8% |
29 Nov–16 Dec 2023 | IMAS[75] | 954 | 34% | 42% | 24% |
Sandu vs. Chicu
Fieldwork date |
Polling firm/ Commissioner |
Sample size | None/ Undecided/ Abstention | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Maia Sandu | Ion Chicu | ||||
Independent | PDCM | ||||
19 Sep–10 Oct 2024 | iData | 1,100 | 40.7% | 30.1% | 29.2% |
Sandu vs. Dodon
Fieldwork date |
Polling firm/ Commissioner |
Sample size | None/ Undecided/ Abstention | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Maia Sandu | Igor Dodon | ||||
Independent | PSRM | ||||
2–19 May 2024 | IMAS[69] | 1,088 | 41.3% | 43.5% | 15.3% |
6–13 Apr 2024 | CBS-AXA–WatchDog | 1,008 | 42.2% | 34.9% | 22.9% |
7–12 Feb 2024 | CBS Research[73] | 1,104 | 40.2% | 39.3% | 20.4% |
29 Nov–16 Dec 2023 | IMAS[75] | 954 | 35% | 46% | 19% |
2–19 May 2023 | IMAS[80] | 1,112 | 38% | 45% | 17% |
Sandu vs. Usatîi
Fieldwork date |
Polling firm/ Commissioner |
Sample size | None/ Undecided/ Abstention | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Maia Sandu | Renato Usatîi | ||||
Independent | PN | ||||
19 Sep–10 Oct 2024 | iData | 1,100 | 38.6% | 35.6% | 25.8% |
13–18 Sep 2024 | iData[63] | 1,021 | 35.1% | 32.2% | 32.7% |
29 Nov–16 Dec 2023 | IMAS[75] | 954 | 37% | 30% | 33% |
Sandu vs. Vlah
Fieldwork date |
Polling firm/ Commissioner |
Sample size | None/ Undecided/ Abstention | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Maia Sandu | Irina Vlah | ||||
Independent | Independent | ||||
19 Sep–10 Oct 2024 | iData | 1,100 | 40.2% | 33.2% | 26.6% |
6–13 Apr 2024 | CBS-AXA–WatchDog | 1,008 | 43.2% | 28.3% | 28.5% |
7–12 Feb 2024 | CBS Research[73] | 1,104 | 42.2% | 33% | 24.7% |
29 Nov–16 Dec 2023 | IMAS[75] | 954 | 38% | 35% | 27% |
Endorsements
Party endorsements
The table below lists the political parties and other political organizations that supported any of the candidates in the first and second rounds of the presidential election.
Second round candidate endorsements
Candidate | First round | Endorsement | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Renato Usatîi | 13.79% | No endorsement[93] | ||
Irina Vlah | 5.38% | Against Sandu[94] | ||
Victoria Furtună | 4.45% | Alexandr Stoianoglo[106] | ||
Vasile Tarlev | 3.19% | Against Sandu[95] | ||
Ion Chicu | 2.06% | Against Sandu[97] | ||
Octavian Țîcu | 0.93% | No endorsement[107] | ||
Andrei Năstase | 0.64% | No endorsement[108] | ||
Natalia Morari | 0.61% | Against Sandu[109] | ||
Tudor Ulianovschi | 0.52% | No endorsement[110] |
Results
Incumbent president Maia Sandu and Alexandr Stoianoglo advanced to the runoff, with Sandu winning the first round with about 42 percent.[4] She did best in the central part of the country, with more modest results in Chișinău: having won 48.32% of the vote, she underperformed her best result of 59.97% in Ialoveni District. Sandu's strongest result was abroad, with 70.71% of the vote. In contrast, she recorded her worst results in the autonomy of Gagauzia[111] and the Bulgarian-majority[112] Taraclia District, at 2.26% and 4.44% of the vote, respectively. Meanwhile, Stoianoglo, a native of Gagauzia[113] secured his best result there, with slightly less than 50% of the vote. In addition to Gagauzia, he also performed well in the north of the country,[114] as well as Taraclia.
Candidate | Party | First round | Second round | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Votes | % | Votes | % | |||
Maia Sandu | Independent (PAS) | 656,852 | 42.49 | |||
Alexandr Stoianoglo | Independent (Party of Socialists) | 401,215 | 25.95 | |||
Renato Usatîi | Our Party | 213,169 | 13.79 | |||
Irina Vlah | Independent | 83,193 | 5.38 | |||
Victoria Furtună | Independent | 68,778 | 4.45 | |||
Vasile Tarlev | Future of Moldova Party endorsed by the Party of Communists | 49,316 | 3.19 | |||
Ion Chicu | Party of Development and Consolidation | 31,797 | 2.06 | |||
Octavian Țîcu | Together Bloc | 14,326 | 0.93 | |||
Andrei Năstase | Independent | 9,946 | 0.64 | |||
Natalia Morari | Independent | 9,444 | 0.61 | |||
Tudor Ulianovschi | Independent | 7,995 | 0.52 | |||
Total | 1,546,031 | 100.00 | ||||
Valid votes | 1,546,031 | 98.82 | ||||
Invalid/blank votes | 18,464 | 1.18 | ||||
Total votes | 1,564,495 | 100.00 | ||||
Registered voters/turnout | 3,023,506 | 51.74 | 3,023,506 | – | ||
Source: Central Electoral Commission |
Aftermath
President Sandu attributed the result of the first round and the referendum to foreign interference and described it as an "unprecedented assault on democracy", adding that her government had evidence that 150,000 votes had been bought, with an objective of 300,000. The European Union also said that the two exercises had taken place "under unprecedented interference and intimidation by Russia and its proxies".[115] The United States also noted Russian attempts to "undermine Moldova's election and its European integration".[116] The Kremlin, in response, had denounced the votes in Moldova as “unfree”, casting doubt on what it said was a “hard-to-explain” increase in votes in favor of Sandu and the EU referendum, and challenged her to “present evidence” of meddling.[117]
Instances of vote buying
Four hundred Moldovan citizens were investigated for allegedly receiving money to choose the "no" option in the referendum and vote for a determined candidate in the presidential election. Those found guilty would have been fined 37,000 Moldovan lei (over 1,900 euros), but were given the option of not receiving punishment if they cooperated with the authorities.[118]
The head of the Moldovan Police, Viorel Cernăuțeanu, stated on 24 October that since September, a total of $39 million, including 15 million that month and 24 million in October, had been transferred to over 138,000 people in Moldova through the Russian bank Promsvyazbank, which is banned in Moldova. He added that the number of people that had benefited from this system would be much greater as they would have received money not only for themselves but also for members of their family. This money transfer system was believed to have started in late spring, and was carried out through applications that people downloaded with instructions from interactive chatbots on Telegram. This allowed them to enter the system and benefit from transfers from the bank. Cernăuțeanu stated that Moldovan police had documented and stopped the activity of such bots in 97 Telegram groups.[119]
International reactions
The OSCE election observation mission wrote that the voting process was received "overwhelmingly positively" by its observers. According to the report, "the election administration worked professionally and demonstrated impartiality in their decision-making", while "fundamental freedoms were generally respected and contestants could campaign freely". Regarding media landscape, the report stated that "the majority of ODIHR EOM interlocutors informed that conditions for media work without interference have improved", however it also noted misuse of administrative resources by Sandu's campaign and concluded that media coverage did not provide fully equal opportunities, with several media organizations, most notably the public broadcaster Teleradio-Moldova, favouring Sandu and the government. The Electoral Commission also did not resolve complaints in timely manner, and failed to properly address allegations of misuse of office by the incumbent. The report also acknowledged concerns over illicit foreign interference and disinformation campaigns.[120]
Domestic reactions
In a statement on 24 October, Sandu stated that, despite the instances of vote buying, she had rejected suggestions of annulling and repeating the elections as "no one has the right to deny citizens a massive, honest and free expression of their will". She further stated that, without the buying of votes, "we would have had a clear victory for both the presidential elections and the referendum", and also urged the Moldovan judiciary to "wake up" and address the issue of electoral bribery.[121]
Notes
- ^ a b The President of Moldova traditionally resigns from party membership after taking office. Although Sandu was officially an independent, her campaign was endorsed and funded by Party of Action and Solidarity.
- ^ Munteanu, and the Coalition for Unity and Welfare, were a member of Together Bloc, and nominated and endorsed Octavian Țîcu; however, Munteanu and the party split from the block, claiming Țîcu was too conservative.[44]
- ^ Political organization, not a party, led by Irina Vlah
- ^ a b c Member party of the Together Bloc
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